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INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY AND 
DOMESTIC LAW 
Adam I. Muchmore* 
INTRODUCTION 
The first volume of the Penn State Journal of Law & International 
Affairs seems an appropriate place to think about the relationship 
between international law1 and other forces relevant to multistate 
activity. This essay focuses on one such force—domestic law. First, I 
suggest that domestic law has an important and underappreciated 
role in regulating international activity. Second, I identify several 
types of scholarship that might be particularly suited to a journal of 
law and international affairs. 
Broadly speaking, two types of law are relevant to 
international affairs. The first is international law, consisting of norms 
embodied in treaties, custom, general principles, and judicial 
decisions that purport to provide rules for state and individual 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania 
State University. For helpful comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Tom 
Carbonneau, David Kaye, Kit Kinports, Julia Lee, Catherine Rogers, and Steve 
Ross. Kirill Lavinski, Brandon Merritt, and Keren Wang provided excellent 
research assistance. 
1 For two opposing views of the nature of international law, compare 
MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 132 (2008) 
(suggesting that fundamental norms of international law are based in natural law 
theory), with JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-17 (2005) (suggesting that many rules of international law 
are a result of the rational pursuit of state interests). 
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behavior that do not derive from the domestic law of an individual 
state. The second is domestic law, the positive law of individual states 
(including the laws of component states in federal systems). 
Domestic law applied domestically can have significant 
international ramifications. Domestic laws affect the way states treat 
their own citizens and thus can implicate human rights commitments. 
States also apply domestic laws to foreign citizens, implicating both 
human rights commitments and rights of other states in traditional 
public international law. Furthermore, domestic laws apply, 
increasingly, to transactions and events that cannot be considered 
purely domestic. 
In some transactions, relevant parties are nationals of 
different countries. In others, a party may be a resident of a country 
other than the country of his or her nationality. Or, relevant events 
may take place in more than one country, which may or may not be a 
country where any of the parties have ties of nationality or residence. 
Indeed, the relevant events can take place on the internet, and their 
physical location could be interpreted as anything between 
“nowhere” and “everywhere at once.” The vast majority of these 
multinational transactions are governed by the domestic law of one 
or more of the various states relevant to the transaction. 
Dramatic examples come from the multinational regulatory 
enforcement activities of the United States and the European Union,2 
as well as the emerging regulatory activities of China. 
                                                 
2 This is not to suggest that U.S. and E.U. approaches to extraterritorial 
regulation are identical or even similar. The two enforcement approaches are 
qualitatively different. The United States makes use of criminal penalties, private 
civil litigation, and prosecutorial discretion in ways that are rare or absent in the 
E.U. and its member states. See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 
97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1788-1793 (2011) (describing differences between U.S. and 
European approaches to prosecuting white collar and corporate crime). The E.U. 
relies far less on regulatory enforcement, and more on the desire of multinational 
companies to provide products and services that can be sold in European markets. 
See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012/2013) 
(July 1, 2012 draft on file with author) (describing a “Brussels effect” in product 
regulation similar to the “California effect” previously identified in U.S. 
environmental regulation). 
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In the United States, the largest antitrust fines are routinely in 
international cases,3 with at least twenty fines over $100 million in the 
past fifteen years.4 The largest, a $500 million fine in a vitamin case, is 
now over ten years old.5 The U.S. Internal Revenue Service has 
brought UBS, a major Swiss bank, to its knees over assisting U.S. 
clients in tax evasion—the first major crack in the long history of 
Swiss bank secrecy.6 In 2009, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s 
Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) imposed a fine of $536 
million U.S. dollars against another Swiss bank, Credit Suisse, for 
assisting clients in evading U.S. economic sanctions.7 In the first eight 
months of 2012, OFAC collected over $600 million in penalties for 
violations of U.S. economic sanctions.8 And enforcement of the 
                                                 
3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, Sherman Act Violations 
Yielding a Corporate Fine of $10 Million or More, http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/public/criminal/sherman10.html (last visited Oct 24, 2012). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. On September 21, 2012 AU Optronics Corp. issued a press release 
indicating that a federal district court had imposed a fine of $500 million U.S. 
dollars in an antitrust case. Press Release, AU Optronics Corp (Sept. 21, 2012), 
http://auo.com/?sn=1214&lang=en-US (last visited Oct 24, 2012). This matches 
the largest previous fine (imposed in 1999 against F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd.) in 
nominal terms. See Sherman Act Violations Yielding a Corporate Fine of $10 Million or 
More, supra note 3. The company has indicated it plans to appeal. 
6 U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Offshore Tax-Avoidance and IRS 
Compliance Efforts, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Offshore-Tax-Avoidance-and-IRS-
Compliance-Efforts (last updated Aug. 1, 2012).  
7 Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of Treasury’s 
Office of Foreign Assets Control and Credit Suisse AG, Dec. 16, 2010, MUL-473-
923, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/D 
ocuments/12162009.pdf.  
8 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, Resource Center—2012 
Enforcement Information, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/ 
CivPen/Pages/civpen-index2.aspx (last updated Oct. 22, 2012, 11:06 AM). The 
vast majority of this total ($619 million) came from a single enforcement action 
against ING Bank N.V. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ENFORCEMENT 
INFORMATION FOR JUNE 2012, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/06122012_ing.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 
2012). However, this is not out of step with other penalty totals in recent years. 
OFAC imposed penalties of over: $91 million in 2011, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, Resource Center—2011 Enforcement Information, http://www. 
treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Pages/2011.aspx (last updated 
Oct. 22, 2012, 11:06 AM); $200 million in 2010, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
Resource Center—2010 Enforcement Information http://www.treasury.gov/ 
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Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) continues to be a priority for 
the U.S. government.9 
In 2001, European antitrust regulators blocked the merger of 
the American companies General Electrical and Honeywell after the 
U.S. Department of Justice had approved the merger.10 By 2008, the 
European Commission had fined a major U.S. software company, 
Microsoft, over €1.5 billion in several related antitrust proceedings.11 
In 2009, the European Commission imposed a €1.06 billion antitrust 
fine against U.S. computer-chip maker Intel.12 Outside of antitrust, 
the size of the European market makes it possible for European 
regulations to dictate the composition, manufacturing process, or 
other requirements for many products and services that are sold 
                                                 
resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Pages/2010.aspx (last updated Aug. 25, 2012, 
12:23 PM); and $772 million in 2009, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, Resource 
Center—2009 Enforcement Information http://www. treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/CivPen/Pages/2009.aspx (last updated Aug. 25, 2012 12:23 PM). 
9 See, e.g., Walmart’s Mexican Morass, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2012, at 82, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21553451. 
10 Philip Shishkin, E.U. Members Endorse Move to Bar GE Deal, WALL ST. J., 
June 26, 2001, at A3. 
11 See European Commission decision fixing the definitive amount of the 
periodic penalty payment imposed on Microsoft Corporation by Decision 
C(2005)4420 final, 2009 O.J. (C 166) 08, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ 
/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:166:0020:0023:EN:PDF (imposing fine of €899 
million); European Commission decision fixing the definitive amount of the 
periodic penalty payment imposed on Microsoft Corporation by Decision 
C(2005)4220 final and amending that Decision as regards the amount of the 
periodic penalty payment Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, July 12, 2006, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/37792/37792_2186_8
.pdf (imposing fine of €280.5 million); European Commission decision relating to a 
proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA 
Agreement against Microsoft Corporation, 2007 O.J. (L 32) 50, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:032:0024:0024:EN:PDF 
(imposing fine of €497,196,304). 
12 Summary of a European Commission decision relating to a proceeding 
under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.990 — Intel), 2009 O.J. (C 227) 07, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:227:0013:0017:EN:PDF. 
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worldwide.13 These include cosmetics, processed foods, social 
networks, air conditioning units, and children’s toys.14 
China had no antitrust law before 2008, but it has already 
become a significant gatekeeper in the approval of mergers and 
acquisitions between multinational companies. By August 2012, 
China’s Ministry of Commerce had imposed conditions on at least 
thirteen mergers,15 including at least three mergers between non-
Chinese companies that had been unconditionally approved by U.S. 
and European regulators.16 This included conditions imposed on: 
U.S. hard-drive maker Seagate’s acquisition of the hard drive division 
of South Korea’s Samsung; U.S. automaker General Motor’s 
acquisition of U.S. auto-parts-supplier Delphi; and U.S. internet-
search provider Google’s acquisition of U.S. cellphone manufacturer 
Motorola Mobility.17 
These examples, of course, raise an important question: 
where does international law enter the picture?18 In terms of 
                                                 
13 See Bradford, supra note 2. 
14 Id. 
15 See, e.g., Announcement of Approval with Additional Restrictive 
Conditions of the Acquisition of Motorola Mobility by Google, No. 25 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, May 
31, 2012) http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/policyrelease/domesticpolicy/ 
201206/20120608199125.html (China); Margaret Wang, China’s Current Approach to 
Vertical Arrangements Under the Anti-Monopoly Law, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, May 
16, 2012, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Free/cpiasiaw 
ang.pdf.  
16 Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, China’s Antitrust Regulator MOFCOM 
Approves Google’s Acquisition of Motorola with Conditions, Davis Polk Client NewsFlash 
(May 24, 2012), http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/31302b00-317b-
48a4-b718-a753dfd28f23/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d91771bc-ac0c-
4140-8a80-a9b727e6a885/052412_antitrust.html. It has blocked only one proposed 
deal, Coca-Cola’s unsuccessful attempt to acquire Huiyuan, a Chinese juice 
manufacturer. Id. Because this involved acquisition of a Chinese company, I do not 
include it in the above discussion of China’s extraterritorial regulatory efforts.  
17 Id. 
18 International law is undoubtedly relevant to multistate activity. 
Whether its rules serve simply to coordinate behavior or exercise independent 
normative force, it is something which matters to states. Their official rhetoric 
relies heavily on the language of international law, GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra 
note 1, at 168-170, and their resource allocation decisions indicate that they value 
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international law doctrine, it enters with the law of international 
prescriptive jurisdiction, the body of international law relating to 
when states can prescribe legal rules to affect conduct that is not 
purely domestic.19 Treatises, casebooks, and law-reform efforts set 
out a group of categories that are said to justify such prescriptive 
jurisdiction.20 Territory and nationality start the list as generally-
accepted categories.21 These are typically followed by effects-based 
jurisdiction, sometimes with the proviso that jurisdiction based on 
physical effects is more broadly accepted than jurisdiction based on 
economic effects.22 After effects, passive-personality jurisdiction 
(based on harm to a state’s nationals)23 and protective jurisdiction 
(based on harm to a state’s security interests)24 round out the list of 
standard grounds. A principle of “reasonableness” is sometimes set 
out as a limit on activities otherwise falling within one or more 
categories.25 Universal jurisdiction is included at the end of most lists, 
setting out the idea that for a very limited set of offenses (piracy is 
                                                 
technical competence in international law analysis. Yet public international law—
particularly in its formalistic sense—generates academic attention that may exceed 
this admitted substantive importance. It may be of great concern to lawyers in 
ministries of foreign affairs, non-governmental advocacy organizations, and 
international trade and arbitration practice groups. But to the vast majority of 
attorneys dealing with international issues, “international law” is not of primary 
concern. Domestic law has far more importance to the mundane, daily activities of 
international business—the movement of goods, money, persons, and technologies 
across international boundaries.  
19 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 401 (1987) (distinguishing between jurisdiction to prescribe, 
jurisdiction to adjudicate, and jurisdiction to enforce).  
20 See, e.g., Harvard Research on International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect 
to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 435, 445 (1935). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987). 
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 402(1) (a)-(b) (1987) (territory); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(2) (1987) (nationality). 
22 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 402(1)(c) (1987) (not distinguishing between physical and 
economic effects); id. cmt. d (discussing possible distinction between physical and 
economic effects).  
23 Id. at § 402, cmt. g (1987). 
24 Id. at § 402(3); id. cmt. f (1987). 
25 Id. at § 403 (1987). 
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usually listed as the paradigmatic example), any state may exercise 
jurisdiction.26 
Yet, despite the technical names, it is not clear that these 
jurisdictional categories—even if applied strictly—would limit state 
behavior in typical enforcement actions. The number of situations in 
which states have an incentive to apply their law extraterritorially, but 
that do not fall into one of these categories (involving a national, an 
event on state territory, a physical or economic effect on state 
territory, harm to a national, or harm to the state’s security interests), 
seems small. Accordingly, the public international law of prescriptive 
jurisdiction may serve more to enable than to constrain state action. 
To the extent “reasonableness” is an international-law requirement (a 
contested proposition),27 it would appear to do more work than any 
of the jurisdictional categories themselves. 
This apparent prevalence of domestic over international law 
in governing multinational activities makes it a subject worthy of 
sustained analysis. Academic writing certainly has addressed the 
extraterritorial application of domestic law. Some articles oppose 
extraterritorial application of the particular laws,28 others favor of it,29 
                                                 
26 Id. at § 404 (1987). 
27 See Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The 
Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT’L. L. 53, 54-55 (1995) (questioning the 
assertion that international law contains a “reasonableness” requirement); Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Book Review, International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness: Essays 
in Private International Law, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 391, 392-93 (1997) (same). 
28 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous 
Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 208 (1996) 
(questioning the value of extraterritorial application of U.S. securities law); Austen 
Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 874 
(2009) (arguing that extraterritorial application of domestic law erodes cooperation 
and is accordingly harmful to the international system). 
29 See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 38 (2008) (arguing against comity-based deference to 
international markets); Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. 
INT’L L. J. 121, 124-25, 188 (2007) (arguing for new constitutional test that would 
permit expansive extraterritorial application of U.S. anti-terrorism laws). 
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and there are many positions in between.30 Others articles focus on 
conflict-of-law31 and statutory interpretation32 theories. Some writing 
offers empirical analysis of how lower courts apply the vague 
standards that typically result (at least in the United States) from high-
court decision-making.33 
Yet the actual operation of domestic extraterritorial 
enforcement programs receives less attention than it deserves.34 
                                                 
30 See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After 
the Insurance Antitrust Cases: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 750, 758 (1995) (advocating that courts balance interests statute-by-statute rather 
than case-by-case in extraterritoriality cases); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in 
an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 289, 290 (1993) 
(criticizing the international economic policy implications of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Hartford Fire decision). 
31 See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: 
An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L. J. 101, 104-05, 169 (1998) 
(advocating that courts should apply a unilateral, rather than a multilateral, conflict-
of-laws theory when deciding extraterritoriality cases); Larry Kramer, Vestiges of 
Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 207 (1991) 
(suggesting that the U.S. Supreme Court’s Aramco decision was in many ways a 
return to Bealean territorial thinking). 
32 See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 90-91 (1998) (arguing that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality should be treated as weak presumption, 
useful as a means of determining unexpressed congressional intent, rather than as a 
clear statement rule); Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. 
Law, 24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 1-2 (1992) (arguing that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality should be replaced with a presumption that Congress 
intends a statute to apply extraterritorially when extraterritorial application would 
be consistent with contemporary principles of international law). 
33 See, e.g., Tonya L. Putnam, Courts Without Borders: Domestic Sources of U.S. 
Extraterritoriality in the Regulatory Sphere, 63 INT’L ORG. 459 (2009) (reporting results 
of empirical analysis of U.S. federal court decisions in extraterritoriality cases). 
34 An emerging body of work is beginning to address the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs and 
the Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, N.Y.U. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-35, 3-4, 38-40 (2012) (reporting results of 
empirical analysis of FCPA enforcement actions); Joseph W. Yockey, FCPA 
Settlement, Internal Strife, and the Culture of Compliance, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 689, 715-16 
(2012) (suggesting that aspects of current FCPA enforcement policy may impede, 
rather than promote, a culture of corporate self-policing); Mike Koehler, The Façade 
of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 998-1001 (2010) (criticizing the use of 
out-of-court settlements to resolve most FCPA enforcement actions). 
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Fortunes of international companies are made and lost by domestic 
enforcement decisions, and senior executives increasingly find 
themselves facing long jail sentences for white collar crimes, perhaps 
even in a state that has never been their home.35 Given these realities, 
there is room for additional attention to situations where the 
extraterritorial scope of a statute is not seriously contested.36 
I. THREE IMPLICATIONS 
The domestic source of many of the laws regulating 
international business has several ramifications for understanding the 
regulatory regime applicable to international activities. First, 
procedures for conducting domestic investigation and enforcement 
proceedings influence the degree to which domestic substantive law 
actually affects international activity. Second, the same activity will 
frequently be subject to the laws of multiple countries. Sometimes 
compliance with all applicable laws will be possible; at other times, 
compliance with one regulatory regime will necessarily entail at least 
technical violation of the laws of another regime. Third, the types of 
admissions and disclosures governments require to settle 
enforcement proceedings will influence the success rate of related 
civil claims. 
A. Substance and Procedure 
Legal historians have long observed that procedural rules 
influence the scope of substantive law.37 Economic analysis has 
                                                 
35 See Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades, 
Address at the 24th National Institute on White Collar Crime, (Feb. 25, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515.htm (noting number of 
foreign defendants serving jail time for criminal violations of U.S. antitrust law). 
36 For a more detailed discussion of statutes with broadly accepted 
extraterritorial scope, see Adam I. Muchmore, Jurisdictional Standards (and Rules), 46 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming 2013). 
37 See, e.g., F. W. MAITLAND, EQUITY—ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT 
COMMON LAW—TWO COURSES OF LECTURES 295 (A. H. Chaytor and W. J. 
Whittaker ed. 1929) (quoting 1 HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON 
EARLY LAW AND CHIEFLY SELECTED FROM LECTURES DELIVERED AT OXFORD 
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described a similar phenomenon with respect to traditional crime: the 
actual rate of compliance with substantive law should be directly 
related to the likelihood that a violator will be caught and 
convicted—an outcome that depends, in part, on the types of 
investigative and trial procedure the law permits.38 
In the United States, at least three aspects of government 
enforcement procedure heavily influence the scope of substantive 
law. First, the executive frequently enforces broad, open-textured 
(standard-like)39 legal requirements.40 Second, a large proportion of 
major government investigations are settled before trial (and 
sometimes outside of court).41 Third, enforcement priorities change 
                                                 
389 (1883)) (observing that procedural rules have exercised a profound influence on 
the development of English substantive law).  
38 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POL. ECON. 169, 176-78 (1968) (suggesting that criminal activity is a function of 
the likelihood of apprehension and severity of punishment). The likelihood that a 
violator will be caught and convicted is itself a function of criminal procedure rules 
governing investigation and trial.  
39 On the distinction between rules and standards and its influence on the 
effective content of substantive law, see Muchmore, supra note 36. 
40 See, e.g., The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (prohibiting “[e]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations”); The 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (prohibiting “in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security” the use of “any manipulative 
or deceptive device or contrivance”). 
41 See Lars Noah, Administrative Arms-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional 
Delegations of Authority, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 873, 891 (1997) (“As is true with civil 
lawsuits and criminal prosecutions, the vast majority of all administrative 
enforcement proceedings result in settlements.”). Cf. Bribery Abroad: A Tale of Two 
Laws, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2011, at 80, http://www.economist.com/ 
node/21529103 (noting virtual absence of trials in FCPA enforcement actions 
against corporations); Free Exchange: Fine and Punishment, ECONOMIST, July 21, 2012, 
at 35, http://www.economist.com/node/21559315 (highlighting the frequency and 
magnitude of corporate settlements in the 2012 summer in both the U.S. and the 
U.K.); Milton Handler, Antitrust: Myth and Reality in an Inflationary Era, 50 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 211, 240 n.149 (1977) (setting out statistics from the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s Antitrust Division on cases settled by consent decree between 1962 and 
1974). The second observation may explain part of the first, but that is beyond the 
scope of this essay. On the wide breadth of federal criminal law and its relation to 
government settlement power, see Samuel Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1662-63 (2007). 
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over time, with available resources, and according to the preferences 
of government officials.42 
Accordingly, understanding what the law “is” in a particular 
area subject to regulation requires more than a simple reading of 
written laws and published court decisions. A party seeking to 
comply with the most restrictive possible reading of every 
government requirement would not only face severe competitive 
pressures, but would frequently be conforming its behavior to a 
standard beyond that intended43 by the requirements’ drafters.44 
Intelligent compliance requires an analysis of current and potential 
future government policies. Potential sources include speeches by 
government officials, formal policy statements, and perhaps most 
importantly, information about the factual background of prior 
enforcement actions and the terms on which those actions were 
resolved.45 
                                                 
42 According to press reports, the U.S. Department of Justice was 
pursuing only eight FCPA cases in 2001. Schumpeter: The Corruption Eruption, 
ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2010, at 87, http://www.economist.com/node/16005114. It 
was reportedly pursuing 150 as of April 2010. Id. 
43 For those who accept the distinction between rules and standards, this 
should hold regardless of one’s view of the degree of intent that can be attributed 
to collective bodies such as legislatures and agencies. Cf. MAXELL L. STEARNS & 
TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 264-80 
(2009) (describing several academic theories skeptical of the idea of legislative 
intent). 
44 Such a strict view would of course be open to individuals, but is at 
least arguably problematic for managers with a fiduciary obligation to maximize 
shareholder profits. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATIES ON THE 
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 10:1 (2011) (discussing fiduciary duty generally).  
45 The information available on prior enforcement actions varies 
substantially between regulatory areas and by type of settlement arranged. 
Substantial information is available on enforcement actions resulting in criminal 
plea agreements. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD SECTION, FCPA and 
Related Enforcement Actions, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ 
cases/a.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) (listing docket numbers and including 
public court filings for over 200 FCPA enforcement actions dating back to 1977). 
Far less detailed information is available on enforcement proceedings resulting in a 
confidential settlement. For an example from the domestic biotechnology context, 
see U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., 
Biotechnology Regulatory Services, Noncompliance History, http://www.aphis. 
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B. Multiple Regulatory Regimes 
The scope of the modern regulatory state means that most 
international actors will face legal requirements from two or more 
states. (While questions remain at the margins and as a matter of legal 
doctrine, it is largely settled that states can regulate some things 
outside of their physical territory—and, in fact, may need to do so in 
order to maintain basic territorial control.)46 
Differences in legal requirements exist along a continuum. 
(See Figure 1.) At one end are differences in substantive policy. At 
the opposite end are differences in technical requirements.47 
Somewhere near the middle are the numerous procedural rules that 







An example of the first extreme, differences in substantive policy, is 
the content—or existence—of antitrust law. For over a century now, 
antitrust law has been a basic part of U.S. economic policy.48 Other 
                                                 
usda.gov/biotechnology/compliance_history.shtml (last updated Aug. 4, 2011) 
(providing only short summaries of most enforcement actions). 
46 Cf. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET: 
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD, 155-156 (2006) (noting that states frequently 
seek to protect their citizens from foreign harms, and often do so by extraterritorial 
application of domestic law). 
47 There may of course be some borderline areas, but the basic 
distinction is useful for analytical purposes. Cf. Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality 
and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 77 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 370, 373 (1983). 
48 Although still far less developed, it is possible that anti-bribery laws 
may be becoming a similarly constitutive aspect of U.S. foreign economic policy. 
Like antitrust law in the latter half of the last century, the United States still 
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countries have adopted economic policies encouraging the 
development of national industrial leaders in ways that are 
fundamentally opposed to U.S. antitrust principles. Historically many 
European countries adopted this type of economic policy;49 today 
China is perhaps the best example.50  
 
 Differences in substantive policy are difficult to resolve 
through technocratic negotiation, and decisions to pursue or drop 
major enforcement actions may involve the highest levels of 
government.51 Differences in substantive policy also have been 
                                                 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, PROGRESS REPORT 2011: ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD 
ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 8-9 (2011), http://www.transparency.org/content/ 
download/61106/978536 (showing Germany is the only country that is beginning 
to come close). However, there is increasing convergence between the United 
States and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries in at least the formal prohibition on foreign bribery. See OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, Dec, 17, 1997, T.I.A.S. No. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 7, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf; OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions: Ratification Status, Mar. 2009, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd 
/59/13/40272933.pdf. 
49 See KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS 
ABROAD 40-42 (1958) (discussing differing policies toward cartels in several 
European countries); Dam, supra note 47, at 373-74 (discussing U.S. antitrust case 
involving watchmaking cartel established with the support of the Swiss 
government). On the strategic implications of the gradual (but far from complete ) 
convergence between the E.U. and U.S. antitrust regimes, see Anu Bradford, 
International Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of the WTO, 48 HARV. INT’L L. J. 
383, 405-410, 418 (2007). 
50 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s 
Republic of China in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 
3, In Re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5466 (E.D.N.Y Jan. 20, 
2011) (No. 06-MD-1738). 
51 See Letter from Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom, to Ronald Reagan, President of the United States (Mar. 29, 1983) (urging 
President Reagan to intervene personally to block a U.S. antitrust investigation 
involving U.K. companies in the civil aviation industry); Memo from Richard Burt 
to George Schultz, U.S. Secretary of State (undated memo in preparation for Dec. 
22, 1984 visit of U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to Washington, D.C.) 
(noting President Reagan’s decision to direct the U.S. Department of Justice to 
close its antitrust investigation involving U.K. companies in the civil aviation 
industry); Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting between U.S. President Ronald 
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prominent in disputes over criminal penalties for insider trading 
(where the United States has criminalized actions that were only civil 
violations in some Asian countries)52 and over the sale of Nazi 
memorabilia (where some European countries have prohibited 
actions that would be protected by the First Amendment in the 
United States).53 
An example of the second extreme, differences in technical 
requirements, is a form that needs to be filed reporting certain 
information relating to a particular transaction. For example, a firm 
may need to file different disclosure documents in different 
jurisdictions. So long as one jurisdiction does not require withholding 
of information that another jurisdiction requires disclosed, the firm is 
able to comply with the technical requirements of more than one 
jurisdiction. Many differences in technical requirements lead to 
increased compliance costs but few substantive problems. 
In between the two extremes are procedural rules with 
substantive implications. These rules, while phrased in terms of 
procedure, can create conflicting requirements or differing incentive 
structures that in effect alter the substantive requirements of a law. 
                                                 
Reagan and U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (Dec. 28, 1984) (noting that 
Prime Minister Thatcher “expressed her immense gratitude for the President’s 
courageous decision” to halt the antitrust investigation involving U.K. companies 
in the civil aviation industry, but indicating her displeasure at learning that the 
Reagan Administration did not plan to introduce legislation to remove the treble 
damages provision from U.S. antitrust law). These documents are available at the 
website of the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/. 
See also Dam, supra note 47, at 374. 
52 See Insider Trading in Hong Kong: To the Dungeon, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 
2009, at 35 http://www.economist.com/node/14460534 (“[i]nsider trading was 
not even a criminal offense in Hong Kong until 2003”); Anthony Lin, Letter From 
Asia: Landmark Decision Reached in First Hong Kong Insider Trading Trial, AM LAW 
DAILY (Mar. 13, 2009), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/ 
2009/03/hong-kongs-first-criminal-trial-for-insider-trading-has-resulted-in-the-
conviction-of-a-former-investment-banker-and-fou.html (noting that before 2003, 
insider trading was only a civil offense in Hong Kong “and was rarely punished”). 
53 See, e.g., UEJF et Licra c/Yahoo! Inc., No. RG: oo/05308 (Tribunal de 
grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 20, 2000) 
(Fr.), English translation available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/ 
yauctions20000522.htm. 
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Examples include many of the procedural rules that have historically 
led to conflict between the United States and the European countries. 
On the U.S. side, these include: private-attorney-general provisions;54 
treble damages provisions;55 and extensive mandatory discovery.56 On 
the European side, they include blocking statutes57 and banking 
secrecy laws.58 
These regulatory conflicts often involve differences that are 
difficult to resolve through purely legal analysis. Whatever the role of 
power in public international law,59 differences in substantive policy 
frequently involve situations where state power dictates the outcome 
of a dispute. Powerful countries can exercise more extraterritorial 
authority than weak countries.60 Countries with assets relevant to 
                                                 
54 See generally Hannah Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global 
Age: Public Interests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 219, 
222-223 (2001) (describing private-attorney-general provisions). 
55 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §15 (2006) (providing that “any person who shall be 
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust 
laws” may sue to “recover threefold the damages by him sustained”). 
56 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (providing for discovery “regarding any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense”); see also GARY 
B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED 
STATES COURTS 941-62 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing disputes over U.S. discovery 
orders requiring production of materials located abroad). 
57 See generally BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 56, at 649-50 (describing 
blocking statutes). 
58 See Don’t Ask, Won’t Tell: Amid a Global Squeeze on Tax Evasion, 
Switzerland is the Prime Target, ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 2012, at 46 (“Swiss law 
entrenched bank secrecy in 1934, making it a criminal offence to reveal a client’s 
identity.”), http://www.economist.com/node/21547229. 
59 Compare W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of 
Communication, 75 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 101, 105, 108, 110-111 (1981) 
(describing international lawmaking as a process of communication dependent in 
part on state power) and GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 39-40 (describing 
customary international law as a product of state pursuit of rational self-interest) 
with Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisions in International 
Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1404, 1415, 1440 (2006) (asserting that states have a 
“moral and legal obligation” to comply with international law) (reviewing 
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1). 
60 Of course, weaker countries may choose to operate extraterritoriality in 
areas of high concern to them, but the costs they suffer will limit them in this area 
more than similar costs limit powerful countries. See Muchmore, supra note 36. 
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particular substantive areas can exercise more authority in those areas 
than similarly powerful countries without relevant assets.61 
This is not to suggest that state power is the only determinant 
of extraterritorial scope. To the extent international law serves as a 
limit on state behavior, the international law of prescriptive 
jurisdiction may limit the scope of state extraterritoriality. Outside of 
legal requirements, the ability of private actors to relocate or 
influence domestic political processes (including both the scope of 
law and the exercise of enforcement discretion) can substantially limit 
what a country can do both inside and outside its territory.62 
C. Admissions, Information Disclosure, and Civil Litigation 
Many U.S. federal laws are enforced by both government 
action and private civil litigation.63 This has two important 
consequences. First, the executive branch of government does not 
retain exclusive authority over whether to begin an extraterritorial 
enforcement action. Second, targets of government enforcement 
must consider the potential for follow-on civil litigation after a 
government enforcement proceeding is concluded.64 
A substantial majority of major enforcement proceedings 
initiated by the U.S. government are resolved through settlement 
rather than trial.65 These settlements fall into three primary categories: 
guilty pleas to criminal charges; civil or criminal settlements involving 
                                                 
61 Relevant assets would include financial centers (securities and banking 
regulation), large markets (antitrust and product safety regulation), and natural 
resources (regulation of those resources).  
62 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES 
TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 15-20 (1970) (introducing 
concepts of economics-based “exit” and politics-based “voice” as two opposing 
ways of influencing the behavior of an organization).  
63 Two well-known examples are the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 
U.S.C. § 15, and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j. On the 
relationship between government enforcement proceedings and private civil 
litigation, see Stephen Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 357, 358, 372-74 (1984) (discussing “four determinants of the relative 
desirability of liability and regulation”). 
64 Or follow-on government enforcement after a private civil proceeding. 
65 See supra note 41. 
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an admission of wrongdoing (including non-prosecution and deferred 
prosecution agreements); and settlements “neither admitting nor 
denying wrongdoing.”66 
The tendency of regulated parties to settle rather than force 
the government to try its case relates in part to the structure of U.S. 
evidence law. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, either a judgment 
in response to a guilty plea or a settlement involving an admission of 
wrongdoing can have significant consequences in related civil 
litigation.67 A judgment following a guilty plea is generally admissible 
“to prove any fact essential to the judgment.”68 A guilty plea is also 
perceived as causing substantial (and sometimes terminal) 
reputational consequences for firms, and presenting risks to the 
firm’s operating licenses or ability to do business with the 
government.69 
Even without a criminal guilty plea, a settlement involving an 
admission of wrongdoing can have tremendous consequences in civil 
litigation. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a party’s prior 
statements are not hearsay (and thus may be admissible for the truth 
of the matter asserted) if the statement is one that “the party 
manifested that it adopted or believed to be true” —a criterion that 
an admission of wrongdoing in a settlement agreement is highly likely 
                                                 
66 For more extensive discussion of the use of non-prosecution 
agreements and deferred-prosecution agreements in settling FCPA actions, see 
Koehler, supra note 34, at 933-939. 
67 Preclusion law presents defendants in government enforcement 
proceedings with a similar problem. Under the doctrine of non-mutual offensive 
collateral estoppel, defendants face a significant risk in going to trial against the 
government. A loss in trial against a government agency can in some circumstances 
bar a defendant from re-litigating one or more issues in a related civil claim. See 
Lewis A. Grossman, The Story of Parklane: The ‘Litigation Crisis’ and the Efficiency 
Imperative, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 436-38 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 
2008) (noting the effect of non-mutual offensive issue preclusion on government 
settlement leverage in enforcement actions). 
68 FED. R. EVID. 803(22) (providing that judgments of previous 
convictions—including those that result from a guilty plea—are not excluded by 
the hearsay rule, even if the declarant is available. There is a requirement that the 
plea be to a crime “punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year.”). 
69 See Buell, supra note 41, at 1664-1666 (discussing reputational 
consequences of indictment or conviction of corporations). 
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to satisfy.70 Where a private right of action exists for the precise issue 
that is subject to government enforcement—such as a securities 
fraud action under SEC Rule 10b-(5)71 —forcing a company to admit 
to wrongdoing could “remove . . . potentially all barriers to private 
liability, including trial risk for the plaintiff.”72 
These evidentiary rules give a government agency substantial 
power to influence the enforcement target’s later exposure to related 
civil litigation. Consequently, the type of admission the government 
requires should affect the amount an enforcement target is willing to 
pay to settle the potential charges. All other things being equal, the 
government should be able to extract a larger payment by offering a 
settlement neither admitting nor denying wrongdoing.73 This option 
will least impair the target’s defense in follow-on litigation. The value 
of this option depends on how much the admission would increase 
the probability of the target’s losing in such litigation, the amount of 
that loss, the effect on possible settlements with future litigants, and 
the expected effect on the company’s good will. 
                                                 
70 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B). They are accordingly admissible so long as 
they are relevant, FED. R. EVID. 402 (providing that evidence is admissible only if 
relevant), not unduly prejudicial, FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing that relevant 
evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed” by its 
prejudicial effect), and not excluded by other evidentiary rules. 
71 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (codification of SEC Rule 10b-(5)). 
72 Samuel W. Buell, Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability, in 
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE 
CORPORATE CONDUCT 87, 100 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 
2011); see also id. (“Class action plaintiffs could simply print a copy of the settlement 
documents in the SEC enforcement proceeding, take them to a judge and if 
necessary a jury, and offer them as admissions to support denial of a motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment, or even to support a jury verdict.”). 
73 This should be true regardless of the strength of the government’s case 
at trial. At any probable government victory below 100% (at perhaps even then due 
to transaction costs), the target will be willing to pay some marginally lower amount 
for a settlement that increases exposure to civil litigation risk than a settlement that 
does not. A possible exception is a target that is effectively judgment proof for the 
amount of money at stake.  
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II. UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
Having discussed the importance of domestic law for 
international activity, I suggest four methodological approaches that 
may be relevant for a journal focusing on the intersection between 
law and international affairs. These are grounded broadly in the law-
and-economics tradition of legal scholarship.74 
A. Law Outside the Courts 
In studying purely domestic law, an important component of 
legal scholarship has sought to understand how both law and non-
legal norms function outside of the context of court enforcement.75 
While a few scholars have moved in this direction in understanding 
public international law,76 much international law scholarship 
continues to focus on enforcement of international law by domestic77 
                                                 
74 I do not mean to suggest economic analysis as the only relevant 
perspective. I do believe, however, that the application of domestic law to 
international activity presents numerous issues that can be usefully analyzed from 
an economic perspective. Other traditions likely to offer useful insights on the 
application of domestic law to international activity include comparative studies, 
historical studies, and perhaps anthropological studies.  
75 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 4 (1991) (presenting results of empirical study of 
informal dispute-settlement among neighbors, and noting that findings “add to a 
growing library of evidence that large segments of social life are located and shaped 
beyond the reach of law”); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton 
Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
1724, 1724-25 (2000) (analyzing role of extralegal norms in the cotton industry); 
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1771-77 
(1996) (analyzing role of extralegal norms in the grain and feed industries); Lisa 
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond 
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115-17 (1992) (analyzing role of extralegal norms 
in the diamond industry). 
76 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 26-35 (arguing that 
many phenomena typically described as customary international law can be 
explained through one of four models of states acting in their own self-interests); 
Bradford, supra note 49, at 438-39 (analyzing international antitrust negotiations and 
suggesting that existing incentive structures may lead rational states to choose 
informal cooperation over legally binding commitments). 
77 The literature on the enforcement of international law in domestic 
courts—particularly U.S. courts—is too numerous to cite. For two opposing views 
 2012 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 1:2 
382 
and international courts.78 This focus on courts has obscured the role 
of non-court enforcement as a major determinant of ex ante behavior. 
A deeper understanding of the dynamics of out-of-court regulatory 
enforcement could have significant explanatory power.79 
B. Rational Choice Theory 
By definition, extraterritorial application of domestic law 
involves at least two states—the law-applying state and the foreign 
state in which the law is applied.80 The power of the two states may 
differ, but each state retains some ability to act unilaterally—both in 
the current situation and in future interactions. 
Rational choice theory offers tools for analyzing such 
interactions. Whether through two-by-two games, extended form 
games, or complex multi-level models,81 this theoretical approach 
should offer insight into many interactions between states. Under 
what circumstances can we expect aggressive enforcement by one 
state (of, say, anti-bribery laws) to encourage, rather than discourage, 
the other state from devoting additional resources to that issue? 
                                                 
on the degree to which international law can serve as a rule of decision in U.S. 
courts, compare Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law, and the 
Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 935-36 (2007) (arguing that the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain only provided for 
limited application of international law in U.S. courts); with Beth Stephens, Sosa, 
The Federal Common Law and Customary International Law: Reaffirming the Federal Courts’ 
Powers, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 269, 271 (2007) (arguing that the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain provided for broad 
application of international law in U.S. courts). 
78 See, e.g., Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A 
Goal-Based Approach, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 225-230 (2012) (surveying existing 
literature on the effectiveness of international courts and proposing increased use 
of social-science-based research methodologies). 
79 The emerging FCPA literature has begun to scratch the surface with 
respect to out-of-court enforcement of U.S. anti-bribery law. See Koehler, supra 
note 34, at 907. 
    80  This excludes, of course, situations where a state’s law is applied on the 
high seas or in other areas not claimed by any state. 
81 See generally DOUGLAS BAIRD ET AL, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 10-
11, 50-52, 75-78 (1994); see also Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in 
International Trade Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 253, 263-68 (2006) (modeling U.S. 
negotiations for rule-based WTO dispute resolution as a two-level game). 
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Under what circumstances can we expect a crackdown on one tax 
haven to reduce, rather than relocate, tax evasion? Under what 
circumstances will increased inspection of imports result in increased 
product safety, rather than a relaxation of safety standards in the 
exporting country? For these types of questions, an analysis of the 
appropriate domestic-law policy depends on an understanding of 
how foreign countries or their citizens will react. 
C. Predictable Non-Rationality 
Rational choice analysis is only one step toward a more 
complete understanding of domestic extraterritoriality. Behavioral 
psychology has demonstrated that individuals respond in non-rational 
but predictable ways to particular situations.82 States are led by 
individuals, who respond to constituencies of other individuals. 
Applying cognitive psychology to leaders and constituencies should 
refine—and sometimes refute—rational-choice predictions about the 
consequences of particular policies. 
D. Empirical Analysis 
Congress frequently structures the extraterritorial scope of 
statutes as standards, rather than rules.83 Often the relevant 
substantive law is also more standard-like than rule-like. This two-
level standard makes predicting how the law will be applied—and 
thus, in a Holmesian sense, what the law is—difficult in borderline 
situations. One solution to this uncertainty is the practitioner’s 
approach—a hunch based on years of experience (often including 
non-public knowledge) analyzing similar situations.84 Another 
approach, more suited to the academic setting, is large-n and small-n 
                                                 
82 See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473-74 (1998) (proposing the use of behavioral 
economics as a supplement to traditional, rational-choice-based economic analysis 
of the law).  
83 See Muchmore, supra note 36. 
84 Cf. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON 
LAW AND ITS STUDY 99-100 (1930) (noting that experienced practitioners rely on 
educated “hunching” to predict case outcomes). 
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empirical analysis of publicly available data.85 This could usefully test 
rational choice, behavioral, and anecdotal conclusions about the 
effective content of existing law.86 
III.  NATIONAL AND GLOBAL WELFARE 
I wish to begin this section by clarifying two things I have not 
argued in this essay. First, I have not argued that international law is 
not “law,” or that states should be able to act contrary to 
international law without risking negative consequences. My goal has 
simply been to highlight the continuing significance of domestic law 
to international activity, and to suggest some ways that this might be 
relevant to legal scholarship. Today, all mainstream views of 
international law see application of domestic law to multinational 
activity as permissible in at least some circumstances. The way states 
use whatever discretion they have should itself be of significant 
interest. 
Second, I have not argued that legal scholarship should limit 
itself to issues that are of concern to the practicing lawyer. Many 
issues that arise in private practice are fact-specific and tied to the 
interests of individual parties. An academic article on these topics 
might save a practicing lawyer research time, or serve a role similar to 
an amicus brief for one side or the other. Although this may at times 
be useful, it is not generally the most productive aspect of the 
academic enterprise. 
Instead, I intend to suggest that domestic-law enforcement 
decisions play a major role in international policy—and that these 
decisions may not have received the level of systematic attention they 
                                                 
85 See, e.g., Putnam, supra note 33. See generally Ran Hirschl, The Question of 
Case Selection in Comparative Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 132 n.22 (2005) (explaining 
differences between “large-N” and “small-N” studies).  
86 For example, Oona Hathaway has done several large-n empirical 
studies of treaty compliance. See Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to 
Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 588, 613 (2007); Oona A. 
Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: A Political Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 513-30 (2005); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a 
Difference?, 111 YALE. L. J. 1935, 1938-39 (2002). 
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deserve. Moreover, there may be aspects of domestic-law 
international enforcement policy that lend themselves to such 
systematic analysis. 
In particular, most national regulators are likely to face 
incentives (such as democratic elections) that encourage them to 
pursue national, rather than global, welfare. Moreover, many issues 
subject to extraterritorial regulation involve collective action 
problems. 
The distinction between global and national welfare is 
implicated because many instances of the behaviors sought to be 
regulated by extraterritorial statutes involve costs outside of the state 
that has the most direct ability to control the behavior at issue. A 
cartel among Chinese exporters may increase welfare in China, but 
reduce welfare (in a greater amount) within other countries. In that 
case, the cartel is Kaldor-Hicks efficient87 within China, but 
inefficient at the global level. By applying (or threatening) to apply 
their antitrust laws to the Chinese exporters, other countries may be 
able to alter the incentives of either the Chinese regulators or the 
companies of the cartel. 
Collective action problems exist because enforcement 
activities are costly and high levels of regulation can reduce the 
competitiveness of national firms. Anti-bribery laws are an example. 
Prohibiting domestic firms from bribing foreign government officials 
is likely to reduce national welfare—at least in the short term—if 
other countries do not enforce similar prohibitions. This is the 
situation the United States faced after the passage of the FCPA in 
1977.88  
More broadly, regulatory enforcement actions can have 
distributional consequences favoring—or disfavoring—the economy 
of the state taking the enforcement action. Few regulatory 
                                                 
87 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 
1.2 (8th ed. 2011) (explaining Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). 
88 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat 
1495. 
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enforcement actions are likely to be Pareto superior,89 even within an 
individual economy.90 The target of the enforcement action will 
almost certainly be worse off. Enforcement decisions are more likely 
to increase net welfare91 (with both winners and losers), although 
even Kaldor-Hicks efficiency hardly can be guaranteed—some 
enforcement actions may in fact reduce net welfare. 
From a global-welfare perspective, Pareto superiority seems 
just as unlikely, but Kaldor-Hicks efficiency raises concerns beyond 
those present in purely domestic enforcement actions.92 Actions that 
are Kaldor-Hicks efficient are welfare-enhancing within the relevant 
society, but make some parties worse off. Actions can be Kaldor-
Hicks efficient on a global level but have those made better off 
concentrated in one country and those made worse off concentrated 
in others. 
Of course, similar situations exist within any state that has 
political or geographical subdivisions. Still, at least as a matter of 
political theory, concerns with the distributional implications of 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency are mitigated in democratic societies by 
political mechanisms. National regulators are selected by national 
political processes, and self-interested actions by state regulators are 
constrained by mechanisms such as the U.S. Constitution’s Dormant 
Commerce Clause.93 
At the present time, no similar global political process exists, 
and it does not seem likely that one will develop in the foreseeable 
future. Accordingly, countries will continue to exist in a system where 
they will be tempted to implement regulatory policies: (1) that are 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient from a national perspective, even if welfare-
                                                 
89 See generally POSNER, supra note 87, § 1.2 (explaining Pareto superiority). 
90 Id. (questioning the possibility of Pareto superior changes in the real 
world); see also Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 
YALE L.J. 1211, 1216, 1229 (1991) (same). 
91 See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 
42, 47-48 (5th ed. 2008) (explaining basic concepts of welfare economics). 
92 Cf. Calabresi, supra note 90, at 1221-1227 (discussing distributional 
concerns associated with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). 
93 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; LEA BRILMAYER ET AL, CONFLICT OF 
LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 376 (6th ed. 2011). 
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reducing from a global perspective; and (2) that, even if coincidentally 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient from a global perspective, contain a 
concentration of winners within the regulating state and a 
concentration of losers in one or more other states. 
In such a situation, an excessive focus either on the open-
textured international law of jurisdiction to prescribe or on 
formalistic domestic-law theories is unlikely to provide a complete 
picture of the regulatory environment. These approaches can usefully 
be supplemented by analysis of non-court enforcement mechanisms; 
formal modeling and rational choice theory; incorporation of insights 
relating to predictable non-rationality; and empirical testing. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I have sought to suggest several types of scholarship that 
could be particularly suited to a journal of law and international 
affairs. There are of course many others, some of which may involve 
“law” far less directly. However, regardless of the reader’s views 
about the nature and effectiveness of international law, domestic law 
is even more relevant to the daily business of international life. The 
literature on domestic extraterritoriality has focused extensively on 
territorial scope in borderline situations;94 those where 
extraterritoriality is already accepted may be a more fruitful subject 
for academic analysis. 
Absent world government or hegemony, states must find a 
way to co-exist without a central enforcing authority. In such a 
situation, authority, status, and the distribution of resources are 
determined not only by strict rule-following, but also by actions that 
push, bend, and even violate existing rules. Powerful states use 
domestic law as a tool for these purposes, and back it with an 
enforcement apparatus that dwarfs that available for enforcement of 
international law. Yet, the ability of states—even powerful ones—to 
apply domestic law extraterritorially is limited. 
                                                 
94 See supra notes 28 to 34 and accompanying text. 
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These limits should be greatest when other states perceive the 
relevant domestic enforcement action as promoting national, rather 
than global, welfare. The limits should be lowest when other states 
perceive the relevant enforcement action as promoting global, rather 
than national, welfare. Other states may even wish to step aside when 
one state takes the cost of global-welfare-enhancing enforcement 
action on itself. Yet, this points to an inherent limit on global-
welfare-enhancing enforcement actions—anytime such an action 
promotes global welfare, states have an incentive to free ride and 
hope that other would-be enforcers step up to the plate (and bear the 
relevant enforcement costs). 
Viewing the state as a unitary actor95 suggests that global-
welfare-enhancing enforcement actions will primarily be taken when: 
(1) a state determines that its national welfare is benefitted in an 
amount that is greater than its enforcement costs; and (2) no other 
state has sufficient incentive (or ability) to undertake a similar 
enforcement action. Often, these conditions will not be satisfied for 
particular global-welfare-enhancing extraterritorial enforcement 
actions. All other things being equal, this possibility suggests that—
from a global-welfare perspective—there is likely to be an 
undersupply of extraterritorial enforcement actions that are Kaldor-
Hicks efficient on a global scale. This undersupply should be made 
more severe by opposition from states who would be losers, from the 
Kaldor-Hicks perspective, in the relevant global-welfare-enhancing 
enforcement action. 
Similarly, states will often have an incentive to undertake 
enforcement actions that are welfare reducing on a global scale, but 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient for the enforcing state. However, other 
states—especially those whose welfare would be reduced—have an 
incentive to oppose these nationally-efficient-but-globally-inefficient 
                                                 
95 When the state is not viewed as a unitary actor, interest-group theory 
suggests that states will at times act in the interest of powerful groups rather than 
of the state as a whole. See generally STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 43, at 42-92 
(explaining interest group theory). The overall analysis should not change, but 
significant additional complexities would be introduced to account for the 
differential ability of particular groups to pressure states to undertake, or decline to 
undertake, individual enforcement actions. 
 2012 Muchmore 1:2 
389 
enforcement actions. This opposition should reduce, but not 
necessarily eliminate, the likely oversupply of enforcement actions 
that are in national, but not global, interest. 
This conflict between national and global interests suggests 
an additional perspective on Anne-Marie Slaughter’s theory of 
“global governance” through networks of national government 
officials.96 Critics of government-network theory have suggested that 
Slaughter’s documentation of the many interactions between 
government officials fails to explain why such interaction would 
result in increased international cooperation.97 One possibility is that 
government networks help to mediate this conflict between collective 
action problems and the differing incentives to pursue global and 
national welfare. To the extent that government officials (especially 
executive officials with similar portfolios of responsibility) share 
information, this could help states determine: (1) whether particular 
types of enforcement actions would be supported or opposed by 
other governments; (2) whether enforcement actions would be more, 
or less, costly for one state to undertake; (3) whether another 
government might be willing to take a contemplated enforcement 
action; and (4) whether undertaking a particular enforcement action 
would result in political capital that could be used to influence 
another state’s future enforcement decision. Regardless of whether 
government networks eventually result in a reconceptualization of the 
nature of sovereignty,98 they may already be playing a more limited 
role. These networks may be serving as a forum coordinating the 
interaction between collective action problems and the distinction 
between global and national welfare. 
 
                                                 
96 See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 261 (2004). 
97 See ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 41 (2009). 
98 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 96, at 266-71. 
